The Aims of “Reading Religion Rationally”

By Richard Hennessey

In the online edition of the October 31st Times Literary Supplement there is a brief review by John Polkinghorne of two books that, in his words, “aim to make a more temperate contribution to the debate” than do the recent books “by Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and others [which] tell us that religion is a corrupting delusion.” He complains:

Despite their assertions of the rationality of atheism, the style of their onslaughts has been strongly polemical and rhetorical, rather than reasonably argued. Historical evidence is selectively surveyed. Attention is focused on inquisitions and crusades, while the significance of Hitler and Stalin is downplayed. Believers in young-earth creationism are presented as if they were typical of religious people in general.

My proximate aim in this blog is to review religious beliefs, both in general and in particular, from the point of view of philosophical rationalism; there will be no need for and no reliance upon “strongly polemical and rhetorical onslaughts.” My ultimate aim is to persuade those readers who might be needing persuasion to adopt the point of view of philosophical rationalism and so to abandon fideism and indeed all forms of willingness to adhere to beliefs out of proportion to the evidence in their favor.

To begin with an easy illustration of the approach that my philosophical rationalism takes: orthodox Catholic Christianity holds, in the words of John A. Hardon, S.J., that “Jesus Christ is not either God or man; he is God and man.” Distilling it a bit, we have the thesis:

The man Jesus is also God.

The philosophical rationalism that I espouse cannot simply accept that thesis as true without argument, for it is surely not evident in the way that tautologies like the following are:

The Definition of “Two”: For any entity x and any entity y, if x is not identical with y, then x and y are two (distinct) entities.

The Principle of the Transitivity of Identity: For any entity x, any entity y, and any entity z, if x is identical with y and y is identical with z, then x is identical with z.

The Definition of “Three”: For any entity x, any entity y, and any entity z, if x is not identical with y, y is not identical with z, and x is not identical with z, then x, y, and z are three (distinct) entities.

Nor is it empirically evident in the way that “My desk is laden with books” and “Some of my chairs are laden with books” are. Given the lack of evidence ready to hand, it is surely not surprising that a good number of people not only do not believe the thesis about Jesus to be true, they in fact believe it to be false; thus mainstream Jews and Muslims, along with atheists and rationalists.

But, on the other hand, the philosophical rationalism that I espouse cannot simply deny that thesis as false, for, taken by itself, it is not immediately absurd in the way that contradictions like the following are:

For some entity x and some entity y, x is identical with y and x is not identical with y.

Though God the Father is identical with the one and only God, God the Son is identical with the one and only God, and God the Holy Spirit is identical with the one and only God, yet God the Father is not identical with God the Son, God the Father is not identical with God the Holy Spirit, and God the Son is not identical with God the Holy Spirit.

This latter directly contravenes the principle, companion to that of the transitivity of identity, that:

For any entity x, any entity y, and any entity z, if x is identical with z and y is identical with z, then x is identical with y.

So, if God the Father is identical with the one and only God and God the Son is identical with the one and only God, then God the Father is identical with God the Son. And so too for God the Father and God the Holy Spirit and for God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. Yes, I have just made the claim that the Christian Trinitarian doctrine, at least as thus straightforwardly expressed, is absurd and contradictory. But I hope I will be granted that in making that claim I was not guilty of any “strongly polemical and rhetorical onslaught.”

I said above that the thesis that the man Jesus is also God, taken by itself, it is not immediately absurd in the way that contradictions are. But it is not generally taken by itself, but as embedded in the doctrine of the Trinity.

Hardon sees the same contradictions here as philosophical rationalism does, but believes he has an escape.

     Part of the genius of the Catholic Church, reflected in these pages, is her ability to maintain a careful balance between extremes. Instead of taking one side of a radical “either, or,” she remains faithful to God’s eternal “and,” which spans both sides of what the natural man is inclined to call a contradiction, but which the spiritual man knows is simply a mirror of divine mystery.

     Christianity is therefore full of paradoxes, or apparent contradictions, which the Holy Spirit has successfully proclaimed for two millennia through the Church, which he animates as the soul of her corporate existence.

On the contrary: it is not just that the “natural man” is inclined to call the above contradictions contradictions or that they are but apparent contradictions; they just are contradictions, real contradictions.

I found Polkinghorne’s article at:

http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/the_tls/article2778493.ece.

I quote Hardon from:

John A. Hardon, The Catholic Catechism. A Contemporary Catechism of the Teachings of the Catholic Church (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1975), pp. 24, 23-24. 


2 Responses to “The Aims of “Reading Religion Rationally””

  1. David Says:

    May I suggest that an exploration of why (or how) Hardon uses the expression “apparent contradictions”. Is this simply an unexplained assertion, or does he develop an argument to support such apparency? Or… is apparency merely a quick convenience?Apparent contradiction suggests that once, or when the appearance of contradiction is dusted away, or exploded in the case of a particular obduracy, there will be no residue of contradiction. In other words, is Hardon denying contradiction altogether? And, if he is, why the further need to introduce mystery? Or is mystery inserted as a promissory note: the mystery will be solved when at long last there will be a clarification — solution– from God! Is Hardon using the contradiction and its inherent requirement of reason to be so recognized as a basis for an attack on reason? Is faith then necessarily
    unreasonable?
    Your humble reader.

  2. The Resolute Rationalist Says:

    After a week or so of reflecting on your questions, the best that I can come up with in answer to them is: In speaking of the apparent, to the natural man, contradictions as but apparent, he is denying that they are real contradictions. And so he would say that faith is not unreasonable, as the supernatural man, errrr, the man enjoying the benefits of supernatural grace, would know.

    I assume that he would say that mystery is that which we are faced with in this life, whether we are but natural men or not; it is in the afterlife, when those who enjoy the beatific vision will see as we are seen, and not as in a glass darkly, that the mystery will be dissolved and that the apparence of contradiction will be removed.

    I do think that faith is unreasonable, insofar as it involves belief that is without basis in reason or evidence. I don’t think it necessarily involves belief that is contradictory. A belief that someone is a messiah, though lacking evidence, does not seem to be contradictory.

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